Asymmetric cryptography and practical security

Bibliographic Details
Title: Asymmetric cryptography and practical security
Authors: David Pointcheval
Source: Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology, Iss 4 (2002)
Publisher Information: National Institute of Telecommunications, 2002.
Publication Year: 2002
Collection: LCC:Telecommunication
LCC:Information technology
Subject Terms: cryptography, digital signatures, public-key encryption, provable security, random oracle model, Telecommunication, TK5101-6720, Information technology, T58.5-58.64
More Details: Since the appearance of public-key cryptography in Diffie-Hellman seminal paper, many schemes have been proposed, but many have been broken. Indeed, for many people, the simple fact that a cryptographic algorithm withstands cryptanalytic attacks for several years is considered as a kind of validation. But some schemes took a long time before being widely studied, and maybe thereafter being broken. A~much more convincing line of research has tried to provide ``provable`` security for cryptographic protocols, in a complexity theory sense: if one can break the cryptographic protocol, one can efficiently solve the underlying problem. Unfortunately, very few practical schemes can be proven in this so-called ``standard model`` because such a security level rarely meets with efficiency. A convenient but recent way to achieve some kind of validation of efficient schemes has been to identify some concrete cryptographic objects with ideal random ones: hash functions are considered as behaving like random functions, in the so-called ``random oracle model``, block ciphers are assumed to provide perfectly independent and random permutations for each key in the ``ideal cipher model``, and groups are used as black-box groups in the ``generic model``. In this paper, we focus on practical asymmetric protocols together with their ``reductionist`` security proofs. We cover the two main goals that public-key cryptography is devoted to solve: authentication with digital signatures, and confidentiality with public-key encryption schemes.
Document Type: article
File Description: electronic resource
Language: English
ISSN: 1509-4553
1899-8852
Relation: https://jtit.pl/jtit/article/view/146; https://doaj.org/toc/1509-4553; https://doaj.org/toc/1899-8852
DOI: 10.26636/jtit.2002.4.146
Access URL: https://doaj.org/article/602702707467487b9dccc3501e22e877
Accession Number: edsdoj.602702707467487b9dccc3501e22e877
Database: Directory of Open Access Journals
More Details
ISSN:15094553
18998852
DOI:10.26636/jtit.2002.4.146
Published in:Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology
Language:English