Corruption Control, High-Tech Acquisitions, and the Role of Power Distance.

Bibliographic Details
Title: Corruption Control, High-Tech Acquisitions, and the Role of Power Distance.
Authors: Hoang, Viet Anh, Thai, Hong An, Le, Phuong Uyen, Nguyen, Thanh Huong, Dang, Man
Source: SAGE Open; Jan-Mar2025, Vol. 15 Issue 1, p1-19, 19p
Subject Terms: TRANSACTION costs, TRANSACTION cost theory of the firm, POWER (Social sciences), TARGET acquisition, MANAGEMENT philosophy
Abstract: This study investigates how corruption control influences the choice between high-tech and non-high-tech acquisition targets, using international data from 2000 to 2019. Grounded in the institutional theory and transaction cost economics, we hypothesize that stronger corruption control reduces transaction risks, making high-tech acquisitions more attractive. Our findings confirm a positive relationship between corruption control and high-tech acquisitions, but document an inverted U-shaped effect, indicating that beyond a certain threshold, the regulatory burden may deter high-tech investments. Further, we find that cultural distance shapes acquisition outcomes, reinforcing the cross-cultural management theory that power distance moderates the positive relationship between corruption control and high-tech acquisitions. The study contributes to the literature by highlighting the importance of institutional quality in shaping sector-specific acquisition strategies and offers practical implications for managers and policymakers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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Database: Complementary Index
More Details
ISSN:21582440
DOI:10.1177/21582440251323664
Published in:SAGE Open
Language:English