Bibliographic Details
Title: |
Supply contract design under price volatility and competition. |
Authors: |
Xing, Wei1 (AUTHOR), Zhu, Qing2 (AUTHOR), Zhao, Xuan3 (AUTHOR) xzhao@wlu.ca |
Source: |
International Journal of Production Research. Dec2019, Vol. 57 Issue 24, p7536-7551. 16p. 3 Charts, 4 Graphs. |
Subject Terms: |
*Spot prices, *Commodity exchanges, *Contracts, *Supply chains |
Abstract: |
This study analyses index-based contract designs and contract equilibria in a competitive setting. We consider a two-echelon supply chain consisting of two manufacturers and a retailer. Each manufacturer procures a commodity in a spot market and uses such a commodity to produce a product. The manufacturers initially choose either an index-based or fixed-price contract. Thereafter, the manufacturer that adopts an index-based contract designs the contract price on the basis of the spot and forward prices of its input commodity. Finally, the two products are sold through the common retailer. Our analysis indicates that an index-based contract provides a manufacturer with a contingent pricing mechanism, thereby enabling the contract price to respond to the spot price of its input commodity. If only one manufacturer adopts an index-based contract, then the contract price is designed to respond positively to the corresponding spot price, while the contract design constantly benefits the designer but may either benefit or hurt the rival and retailer. If both manufacturers adopt an index-based contract, then the contract price may be designed to respond negatively to the corresponding spot price. The reason is that the manufacturer intends to dampen competition by adopting an opposite contract price design. Further study shows that in equilibrium, both manufacturers consistently adopt an index-based contact if the spot prices are positively correlated. However, differentiated contract strategies may be optimal for manufacturers if the correlation is negative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
|
Copyright of International Journal of Production Research is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) |
Database: |
Business Source Complete |
Full text is not displayed to guests. |
Login for full access.
|