| Title: |
On the Defensibility and Believability of Moral Error Theory. |
| Authors: |
Olson, Jonas1 jonas.olson@philosophy.su.se |
| Source: |
Journal of Moral Philosophy. 2016, Vol. 13 Issue 4, p461-473. 13p. |
| Subject Terms: |
*METAETHICS, *CONTEXTUALISM (Philosophy), *MORAL realism, *REALISM |
| Reviews & Products: |
MORAL Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence (Book) |
| Abstract: |
This article is a response to critical articles by Daan Evers, Bart Streumer, and Teemu Toppinen on my book Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). I will be concerned with four main topics. I shall first try to illuminate the claim that moral facts are queer, and its role in the argument for moral error theory. In section 2, I discuss the relative merits of moral error theory and moral contextualism. In section 3, I explain why I still find the queerness argument concerning supervenience an unpromising argument against non-naturalistic moral realism. In section 4, finally, I reconsider the question whether I, or anyone, can believe the error theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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| Database: |
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